1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[24]

Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukrainy*). This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

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of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraina Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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missars, Skrypnik, committed suicide in July 1933 in order to avoid arrest.

In that same year Postyshev replaced Kaganovich as 'dictator' in the Ukraine (he only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party). He arrived with orders 'to make an end of the counter-revolution that had woven itself a nest in the Ukraine'. The speech which Postyshev delivered at the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, soon after entering on his office, indicated the new line of Soviet policy.

'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades, when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (nos. 15–21 of the *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934). At the same Congress the chief of the Ukrainian G.P.U., Beletsky, read a report in which he declared that 'Imperialists, through agents and through the remnants of the inimical classes which we have not destroyed and to which belong all the *kulak* and 'Petlyurian' elements of the Ukrainian villages, will yet prepare in the country criminal activities and diversions against the principal objects of our Ukrainian Economic Plan' (*ibid.*). Beletsky then proceeded to read aloud a proclamation which was supposed to have been seized by the G.P.U. and according to which Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries were 'dreaming about the denationalization of the whole of Ukrainian industry and the re-establishment of large landownership'.

Accusations of this type were of course inventions of the G.P.U., but the speeches of the head of this grim organization and of his political chief Postyshev indicate that the new policy of the Soviets was directed to the destruction both of the institution of private property among the Ukrainian peasants and of their national characteristics of stubborn individualism and love of freedom.

Postyshev had been given two problems to tackle: the first was to root out 'the counter-revolution' alleged to be lurking in the Soviet administration and in the Communist Party in the Ukraine;

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission. 665

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison. [687]●

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Co-operatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks. 1/ 661 575

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

1/ [Ukrainian Soviet Republic -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state.

645 671 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly.

[681]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the
186 collectivization of agriculture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movement which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms that had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuing its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and more important works being produced, and outside and somewhat apart from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was producing ever more serious works.

No one openly thought of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent could be discovered among the entire population. It had been years since there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who had appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and there was no one who was even suspected of the kind of disloyalty that had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 Then, in 1929, just as the compulsory collectivization was being
814 prepared, the Ukrainian Soviet government announced that it had
●687 discovered the evidence of the existence of a secret society, the
661 Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but for the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involved? For the most part they were individuals who had played more or less important roles in the Ukrainian

National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

The Early Trials

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars.

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage.

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

186 814 687 661 Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large hall to which the public was invited by the display of large placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 814 687 661 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Communists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any too severe criticism. That was to come next.

626 538 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] [68] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win. [536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668
the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661
in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687
the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

661 suffered the same fate on the ground that they were intriguing
●687 with Hitler or with the capitalist imperialists.

The Yezhovshchina, as it was called, raged over the entire territory of the Soviet Union and was directed with especial fury against all the leading men in all walks of life, directors of government offices, directors of factories, directors of collective farms, and army officers, if they could possibly be suspected of being disloyal to the Stalinist regime or of having independent thoughts.

The world looked on in amazement, for the Moscow regime seemed to have gone completely mad in its accusations and suspicions. The charges that were made against the outstanding personalities seemed fantastic and contradicted everything that any one knew of the character and actions of the outstanding Communist leaders. To some it seemed as if the revolution were devouring its own children, for Stalin was executing men for proposing policies which he had later adopted himself, as he had in the case of both the right and left deviationists from the general line of the party. To others it seemed an alarming example of the infiltration of all forms of life by the agents of Nazism. All agreed that the actions were extreme and far reaching.

As the purge of the administrative machinery went on, its range increased. Once the head of a bureau or a factory were implicated, the way was open to charge all of his subordinates who had not denounced him with being accessory to his crimes and they were called up and punished or, in rare cases, were acquitted and promoted. The storm continued until late in 1938 when Yezhov himself was removed and suffered the same fate at the hands of the Georgian Beria, who guided the NKVD through World War II.

If such was the fury in the RSFSR, it can well be imagined what were the results in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Communists had set the fashion of accusing their opponents of bourgeois nationalism. When the storm broke, Postyshev, who had been sent down in 1933 to wipe out bourgeois nationalism, to organize the famine and to break the Ukrainian renaissance, was among the first to go. He was removed and disappeared at the hands of Kaganovich, who reemerged for a while as the strong man of the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lyubchenko, who had been appointed the Prime Minister of the UkSSR on the single program of suppressing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was called to Moscow to confront the self-confessed leaders of the nationalists and, on his return to Kiev, he shot himself. His successor, Bondarenko, disappeared without a trace.

Who were these self-confessed leaders? Prominent among them was A. Khvylya, who had been the champion of the general line against Khvylovy and Skrypnyk and who had been the dominant figure in the attack on the Ukrainian literary men and scholars. For years he had resorted to all kinds of attacks to bring Ukrainian grammar and language closer to Russian. He now "voluntarily" confessed that he had worked against the "elder brother" and had joined and aided in developing a secret military force several million strong for the sole purpose of separating Ukraine from the USSR and he swore that in this he had the active aid of Lyubchenko and most of the officials of the UkSSR. Finis.

Zatonsky, the Commissar of Education, was accused of another crime. He had drawn years before the fire of Gorky for suggesting that a mixed language be introduced into Ukrainian schools as the means of absorbing Ukrainian into Russian. He had speedily withdrawn his recommendations under fire and all had seemed forgiven. It was not, and Zatonsky disappeared in the holocaust.

It then came the turn of the writers. Men like Kulyk, who had run roughshod over the older writers and had called for their liquidation, were now found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and with them most of the authors who had emerged during the shattering of the Ukrainian renaissance and who had celebrated the turning of the Ukraine into a collectivized and industrialized state. Each and every one of them confessed that they had been guilty of bourgeois nationalism and they received the due reward for their crimes.

There was hardly a family in Ukraine which did not suffer the accusation of at least one member. The survivors who have escaped abroad have given lurid tales of the extent to which the feeling of distrust and suspicion spread among all classes of the

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

1 [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

true, it is certain that the killing was unintentional and unpremeditated and consequently does not indicate any plan of the nationalists to aid the Autocephalous Church by destroying the chief prelate of the opposing group. That such a plan is even more unlikely is shown by the fact, attested by a source not involved in the dispute, that Alexius was the chief moderating influence in the Autonomous Church.[62] As has been shown, he tried to bring about union, and was on terms of friendship with at least one of the chief Autocephalous churchmen. These circumstances also go far to refute the charge that Alexius was in the service of the German police or, as has also been alleged by nationalist writers, in the service of the NKVD.[63] His personal character, as evidenced by his writings,[64] and the respect in which he was held even by opponents militate against such an accusation, even had not his conciliatory tendency refuted the main burden of the charge that he had fostered the disruption of the church to further the ends of the Germans and the Soviets. The whole incident was in all probability a tragic accident, utilized afterwards as propaganda for the rival groups.

So clear-cut a judgment cannot be offered concerning the second incident involving the slaying of an Autonomous bishop. In the late summer of 1943, Emmanuel, then Autonomous bishop of Vladimir Volynsk, was seized by a band of the UPA (controlled at that time by the OUN-B), taken to one of their forest headquarters, and there, after a "trial," executed as a traitor and a spy. Charges similar to those made against Alexius were the basis for the accusation against his colleague, and, in addition, Emmanuel is supposed to have confessed to having acted as an agent for the German police in betraying underground members.[65] Whether this is true cannot be determined, but certain factors cast considerable doubt upon it. The fact that the same charges were made against Alexius, who was very likely innocent, renders suspicious the accusations made against Emmanuel. The latter

[62] CXLVa 66.
[63] Mykola Selez', "Iak diiut stalins'ki agentury?" (How Do the Stalinist Agent Systems Operate?), *Vpered*, May, 1949, p. 11.
[64] See his letter to Sheptyts'kyi in Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 128–30.
[65] Selez', p. 11; Interview 65.

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was regarded, for another reason, as a traitor, for he had originally been consecrated as bishop of Belaia Tserkov' by the Autocephalous Church, and his subsequent defection to the Autonomous Church, on grounds of the dubious canonical validity of the nationalist religious body, must have been a sore blow to Ukrainian nationalist feeling.[66] He had also issued public statements calling for all the faithful to avoid aiding the nationalist partisans; while nearly everyone in a public position in Volhynia (including an OUN member like the editor of *Volyn'*) was forced to make such statements, it appears likely that Emmanuel may have been rather more vigorous and sincere than others in his circumstances.[67] On the other hand, there is no really trustworthy evidence that he engaged in spying, or other indisputably dishonorable activity, and those who knew him best tend to doubt the charge.[68] Consequently, it appears that his death was due to the fanatic and ruthless spirit which dominated the OUN-B in Volhynia at the time.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to implicate the Autocephalous Church in his killing, and all appearances point to its having been decided upon independently by the partisan forces. It is true that Emmanuel's position was especially distasteful to the UPA because of the contrast it offered to the stand of the most active Autocephalous prelate in Volhynia, Bishop Platonius of Rovno, who actively aided the underground, and is said even to have gone to the UPA camp in Derman to offer his support.[69] It should be pointed out, however, that Platonius was comparatively uninfluential in Autocephalous Church councils. The more typical attitude was that of Polykarp—also resident in Volhynia—who offered vigorous protests against German attacks on the clergy and against the brutal treatment of his people,[70] yet never gave open support or encouragement to the rebels. In this policy of submission to the secular power, even to an evil one, Polykarp

[66] Selez', p. 11; *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[67] Cf. his address to the Ukrainian population, in *Volyn'*, August 8, 1943, p. 3.
[68] Interview 38.
[69] *UAPTs*, p. 10; Interview 18.
[70] CXLVa 66. See also the sharp but respectful protest of Hilarion against the shooting of Autocephalous priests in the Generalgouvernement for contacts with escaped prisoners of war in the spring of 1942—long before there was any widespread nationalist partisan activity (Occ E-2 [2]).

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was, according to his own statement, following the tradition of Orthodoxy.[71]

A few months after the tragic episodes just described, nearly all of the East Ukraine was reconquered by the Red Army. The great majority of the Orthodox bishops, of both the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups, did not await the vengeance which could be expected to follow their opposition to the Soviet plan for using Orthodoxy as a propaganda weapon but fled to the Generalgouvernement. Here they were given considerably more courteous treatment than had been their lot in the Reichskommissariat.[72] Moreover, the Ostministerium felt able at last to push forward its plans for formation of a national church. The project envisaged by Rosenberg's ministry called for union of the two rival branches. Ostensibly this union would have been a compromise, but, like the abortive agreement signed by Alexius, it would have favored the Autocephalous group. The Ostministerium officials in charge of the negotiations were obviously sympathetic to Mstyslav and Hilarion, though somewhat cooler toward Polykarp.[73] On the other hand, they viewed Panteleimon, the real leader of the Autonomous group, as a "Russian" and obstinate; they proposed to induce him to leave the Ukraine altogether by offering him the vacant Orthodox see of Riga.[74] The Autocephalous desire for a union in which there would be for a time "Russian bishops for the Russian minority," who would later be absorbed into the "Ukrainian church," obviously envisaged a relegation of the Autonomous bishops, or at least of those who persisted in favoring Russian cultural and ethnic elements, to an inferior position, yet it was apparently not opposed by the Ostministerium.[75]

[71] CXLVa 66.
[72] *Ibid.*
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid.* The nominal leader of the Autonomous Church, elected to succeed Alexius, was Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk, who appears by this time to have returned to the Autonomous fold (cf. *Volyn'*, July 1, 1943, p. 3).
[75] CXLVa 66. Although this project could not be carried out, the Ostministerium continued to favor to the limit of its capacities the Ukrainian national group in religious as well as political affairs. Cf. Memorandum of Rosenfelder (specialist in the Ostministerium) to Chef des Führungsstabes Politik, December 14, 1944, concerning plans for increasing the influence of the Autocephalous Church among

186 665 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 186 687 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928. The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost $^{2}/_{3}$ of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 519 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a [538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[E. Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but politically faithful to Moscow. 000

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists. 661 651 243

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others. 661 665

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commissar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the 687 ● 186

687 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow
186 Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are
665 shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

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in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

685 Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation [421] of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

[641] Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.